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Parental  beliefs,  recognised  by  child  psychologists  as  a  causal  influence  on  early 
development, are incorporated into a two-period model of human capital accumulation. In the 
first period parents transfer their beliefs, distinct from genes, to their child by signalling their 
„belief in a just world‟ or the perceived return to effort. The child responds by choosing 
effort, irrespective of the real world returns, which combines with their genes to create early 
their ability. This ability determines the rate of return to second period investment and final 
attainment. This is an ontological model, in the sense that children‟s beliefs influence the 
attainment they achieve. The identifying assumption is that parent beliefs are slow-moving 
and they not conditioned on the child. If parents are credit constrained, then both beliefs and 
income determine attainment. Empirical analysis using the NCDS shows that beliefs are a 
strong predictor of early attainment and reduces the importance of parental income or wealth. 





                                                           
1 This paper is based on a chapter of my Doctoral thesis entitled “How Parent Transfers Affect children‟s 
Incentives, with Incomplete Capital Markets” submitted in September, 2010. The views and findings expressed 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
A positive association between family income and children‟s success in education has long 
been recognised in countries with different education systems and income distributions. In 
Becker and Tomes (1986) economic model of the family they show that parents who are „rich 
enough and altruistic enough‟, or who can borrow on behalf of their children, will invest in 
their education up until the altruism discounted rate of return on their education falls to the 
riskless interest rate.
2 But human capital is a poor asset to use as collateral and markets do not 
exist for borrowing against children‟s future earnings. This market incompleteness is usually 
described as a credit constraint. It means that parents who are not „rich enough and altruistic 
enough‟ and cannot borrow on behalf of their child and they are therefore limited to sub-
optimal investment in their children‟s education. This is the traditional explanation of credit 
constraints causing a correlation between parent income and child attainment. 
This  causal  interpretation  has  had  a  strong  influence  on  policy  despite  differences  in 
attainment persisting after many policy initiatives and across many different funding regimes. 
An important issue for policy is to establish if and when in a child‟s life-cycle the credit 
constraint actually binds. The traditional view is at the point of deciding whether to continue 
in further education. In an important paper, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) challenge this 
view by comparing US college attainment of children from families across income quartiles 
and after taking account of test scores at 11 years of age and family background. They find 
that there is at most an 8% difference in enrolment rates between children from the highest 
and lowest family incomes. They propose an alternative hypothesis, that family background 
(e.g.  parent  education,  etc)  influence  children‟s  early  test  scores  and  eventual  attainment 
levels and is also correlated with parental income when the later attainment is measured. The 
conclusion is that the scarce resource is good parenting rather than income or resources. 
However,  this  alternative  hypothesis  merely  begs  the  question  of  why  differences  in 
attainment emerge at early ages between children from families in different income brackets 
in the first place. This is especially puzzling since education services at this age are free. Put 
another way, which part of early test score performance does parent income actually buy? 
And if there is no buying involved, why then do poor families appear to under-invest in their 
children when they offer above average returns and there is no cost involved in a repeated 
                                                           
2 The term „rich enough and altruistic enough‟ is used by Behrman (1997) to indicate where full risk sharing 





3 Part of the solution is to recognise the special importance of early 
child development (ECD) and the role of non-cognitive as well as cognitive skills. Yet even 
with the particular importance of ECD, there is no consensus on which inputs are necessary at 
young ages and why they seem to be linked to family incomes. 
This paper is  in the spirit of the ECD literature. It is an assessment of the importance of 
family culture, in particular the role of parental beliefs, as a causal influence on differences in 
levels of early childhood attainment. In a major cross-discipline review of EDC by the US 
National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, the y report that the  “influence  of 
culture  on  the  rearing  of  children  is  fundamental  and  encompasses  values,  aspirations, 
expectations and practices” and yet “the empirical literature in this area is underdeveloped 
[and the] imperative for extensive research is clear.”
4 This provides a motivation for this 
analysis. It is intended to incorporate some of the long established insights of psychologists 
into an economic framework. Families are interpreted as „institutions‟ which set informal 
rules and codes of conduct.
5 These rules and codes  include the beliefs of parents,  based on 
their own life experiences,  which have a special influence on  their children. These parental 
beliefs shape the beliefs  of their children which influence their actions at school and the 
outcomes as a result. The model can be interpreted as „ontological‟ in the sense that the 
child‟s actions re-enforce their belief system and perpetuate the family culture.  
This paper considers a specific aspect of family culture, parents' belief in a just world (BJW), 
as  a  causal  influence  on  children‟s  early  attainment  levels.  Parents‟  BJW  is  used  in  the 
psychological economics literature as short-hand for the extent to which people get what they 
deserve in life or the degree to which they perceive that effort is rewarded. The idea is that 
parenting involves more than simply investment in stuff, such as books and even time spent 
reading  with  a  child,  which  are  choice  variables  with  costs.  Parenting  also  involves  the 
transmission of family culture which includes beliefs and attitudes, shaped in childhood and 
early adulthood, but which become slow-moving as there are costs to changing beliefs if they 
then become inconsistent with experience.
6 Children then observe the behaviour and attitudes 
of their parents and apply these codes to their own life with consequences for early test 
                                                           
3 Ermisch (2003) points out that the suggestion that this is solely due to inherited genes cannot explain why on 
average inherited ability increases over time. 
4 Shonkoff and Phillips (2000), p.27. 
5 For an economic interpretation of institutions see D. North (2005).  




scores. Note, that while the family is taken as the most obvious way that elders influence the 
beliefs of children, the findings are applicable to guardians and mentors where again the 
purpose is shaping children‟s beliefs and attitudes rather than simply investing time. 
While  concepts  such  as  culture  and  beliefs  are  ubiquitous,  they  are  generally  outside  of 
mainstream  economics.  Yet  excluding  them  from  analyses  can  lead  to  important  biases, 
especially if they are correlated with explanatory variables. For example, endogeniety may 
overstate  the  role  of  parent  income  if  family  beliefs  are  excluded  (assuming  they  are 
positively  correlated  with  income)  and  create  false  inferences  about  credit  constraints. 
However, using culture or beliefs to explain economic outcomes not only requires identifying 
a causal mechanism but also formulating refutable hypotheses to test against the data. Roland 
et al. (2004) considers “what is called culture, including values, beliefs, and social norms, can 
be classified as a slow-moving institution” which Becker (1996) concurs with “because of the 
difficulty  in  changing  culture  and  its  low  depreciation  rate,  culture  is  largely  „given‟  to 
individuals throughout their lifetime.”
7 This view of family culture, in particular beliefs, as 
slow-moving  and  not  conditioned  on  the  performance  of  the  child  is  the  identifying 
assumption in this paper. It is consistent with psychologists‟ interpretation where choosing 
beliefs  which  are  inconsistent  with  experience  would  create  cognitive  dissonance  and  an 
incentive to re-evaluate beliefs to avoid the cost of the dissonance.  
This paper considers one aspect of family culture, parents' belief in a just world (BJW), as a 
causal influence on children‟s early attainment levels. Section 2 includes a review of the 
evidence since Carneiro and Heckman on differences in early child attainment, including 
parental income and family culture. The Carneiro and Heckman model is re-estimated using 
UK data in Annex 2. Section 3 presents a modified version of Becker and Tomes which 
includes  a  two-period  childhood  where  early  learning  benefits  later  investments  through 
complementarity. The early learning is by the transmission of a belief system which shapes a 
child‟s  own  expectations  of  the  return  to  effort.  This  is  an  early  form  of  non-cognitive 
development and creates differences in the return to later investment and the child‟s eventual 
attainment. The hypothesis that parental beliefs are a causal factor is tested using the National 
Child Development Survey (NCDS) in section 4. The evidence suggests that after taking 
including  parental  beliefs  in  a  just  world  then  income  has  little  explanatory  power  on 
children‟s early test scores. Some conclusions are drawn in section 5.   
                                                           




2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the last decade economists have re-focussed their attention on the association between 
parent income and children‟s attainment levels at early stages of development. Almond and 
Currie (2009) note that in 2000 there were no articles on early child development in three 
leading journals and since 2005 there have been five or six per year.
8 Carneiro and Heckman 
(2002) show that differences in children‟s college attainment are, in large part, a reflection of 
differences in earlier attainment levels which in turn are correlated with later parent income. 
This hypothesis is tested using the UK NCDS dataset in Annex 2 and the results show an 
upper limit of only 4% of statistically difference in attainment levels can be explained by 
parent income after taking account of early test scores.
9 This is consistent with Carneiro and 
Heckman but a larger effect than reported in Dearden, McGranahan and Sianesi (2004). 
The significance of early development is succinctly shown in figure 1 which presents NCDS 
cohort members‟ attainment levels at 7 and 11 and participation in full time education at 16 
years of age. The results are shown by parents‟ income quartile measured by total family 
income  when  the  child  is  16  and  the  attainment  levels  are  standardised  for  comparison. 
Differences in attainment are well established at 7, and even widen slightly due to the falling 
relative performance of children from the lowest family income quartile. This corroborates 
with  Cunha  and  Heckman  (2007)  of  differences  in  attainment  at  5,  Ermisch  (2008)  of 
differences in cognitive and behavioural assessments at 3 and Feinstein (2003) of differences 
as early as 22 months old. 
This review is in three sections covering the key arguments to emerge since Carneiro and 
Heckman (2002) on why these early childhood differences in attainment occur. First, the idea 
of generating early abilities and their interaction with later investment is expanded to contrast 
with Becker and Tomes‟ single period production process. This is closer in spirit to child 
psychologists and neurologists and now economists‟ understanding of a dynamic learning 
process.  Second,  some  recent  research  is  presented  showing  that  differences  in  parental 
income in early childhood are particularly important, even controlling for the same total life-
cycle income. This is a re-interpretation of Becker and Tomes‟ credit constraints. Third, the 
                                                           
8 Almond and Currie‟s (2009) sample of journals include the American Economic Review, Journal of Political 
Economy and Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
9 The tests in Annex A differ from Dearden, McGranahan and Sianesi (2004) in that a measure of permanent 
income rather than current income is used to reduce measurement error and test scores at age 7 rather than 11 to 




importance of family culture in the early phase of child development and the few economic 
papers which include culture as an explanatory variable are reviewed. 
Figure 1: Child Attainment by Age and Parent Income Quartile at 16 Years Old 
 
Note: The sample is the NCDS cohort members where income quartiles are based on family income at age 16. 
The test scores are the first principal component of maths and reading test scores at age 7, a general ability test 
score at 11 and a participation rates at school at 16. 
2.1 The Importance of Early Childhood Development 
In  a  series  of  recent  papers,  James  Heckman  and  co-authors  proposed  a  framework  for 
children‟s  learning  process  building  on  extensive  research  by  neurologists,  child 
psychologists  and  non-mainstream  economists.  In  this  cross-discipline  vein,  Knudsen, 
Heckman, Cameron and Shonkoff (2006) report that “virtually every aspect of early human 
development,  from  the  brain‟s  evolving  circuitry  to  the  child‟s  capacity  for  empathy,  is 
affected by the environments and experiences that are encountered in a cumulative fashion, 
beginning in the prenatal period and extending throughout the early childhood years.”
10 The 
authors  suggest  that  a  cross-disciplinary  framework  for  ECD  must  include  the  following 
elements:  
(a) skills are formed by an inextricable interaction between genetics and experiences, 
                                                           
10 Knudsen et al. (2006) quote from Shonkoff and Phillips (2000) p.6. For an introduction to the recent research 











































(b) skills necessary for economic success are created in hierarchical sequence such that later 
attainments are built on early foundations, 
(c) cognitive and non-cognitive skills contribute to attainment levels and success in the work 
place, 
(d) human abilities are formed in predictable sequence of sensitive periods, although they can 
be adapted in other stages. 
(1)  1 ( , ) 1,2
k p k























In  an  attempt  to  capture  some  of  these  cross-discipline  features  in  a  familiar economics 
framework, Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and Masterov (2005) posit a two period recursive 
ability function (1)where the subscripts denote time periods. Ability is a vector of abilities, 
including cognitive and non-cognitive abilities (or skills).
11 The function is increasing in both 
arguments and concave in investment and initial ability 0 A   is  inherited  through  in  utero 
experiences and genetics. Two further assumptions in (2) and (3) describe self-productivity 
and  complementarity.  Self-productivity  captures  how  ability  in  one  period  creates  the 
capacity for greater ability in the next period which Heckman and Lochner (2005) describe as 
„learning begets learning‟.
12 With vectors of ability this may also describe synergies between 
different types of abilities: for example, early learning creates a cognitive capacity which, if 
complemented with  later  non-cognitive abilities, such as motivation,  this  creates  further 
learning and cognitive capacity. Complementarity shows how higher ability in the previous 
period increases the return on investment in the current period. 
An important distinction between this recursive framework and Becker and Tomes is that 
inputs into the production of skills at different stages are assumed to be complements (rather 
                                                           
11 This model has similarities to Todd and Wolpin (2003) and id a generalisation of Ben-Porath (1967).  




than  an  implicit  assumption  of  perfect  substitutes).
13  This is  distinction is key  for three 
reasons. First, complementarity implies that for some abilities early development is mo re 
important than late development or, more generally, there are „critical periods‟ for nurturing 
some  abilities  and  skills.  Second,  complementarity  increases  the  cost  of  remediating  or 
correcting a lack of early investment. Third, this creates an „equity versus efficiency‟ trade-
off for policy. It is efficient to encourage higher second period investment in children with 
highest  first  period  ability  but  this  will  also  widen  the  inequality  in  total  skills  between 
children. In Becker and Tomes there is no equity versus efficiency trade-off as those with 
below optimal investment have a high marginal return to investment.  
The idea of a hierarchical learning process with critical periods for nurturing some abilities is 
well  established  in  psychology  (since  Jean  Piaget)  and  neurology  and  also  observed  in 
experiments with higher primates (see Knudsen et al. (2006)). This has a physical dimension 
as a lack of sensory input during early child development results in abnormal development of 
the brain, for example in terms of perception, interpretation and processing.
14 Two tangible 
examples of „critical period‟ are for learning languages (accent and syntax) which is reported 
to decline from 7 onwards and IQ scores are generally stable after 10 years of age. Similarly, 
non-cognitive  abilities  e.g.  persistence,  emotional  control  and  optimism,  are  important  in 
achieving higher attainment both directly and by enhancing cognitive ability.  
The benefits of early remediation and the „efficiency versus equity‟ trade-off are shown in the 
assessments of previous or current programmes.
15 The Perry Pre-school and Abecedarian 
Programs  in  the  US  are  randomised  experiments  with  disadvantaged  children  which 
introduce treatment at 3-4 years and 4.5 months old respectively. The treatments w ere daily 
classroom sessions and weekly home visits by teachers and the progress of the children were 
followed  up  to  40  and  21  years  of  age  to  observe  the  long -term  effects.  While  the 
interventions  had  no  impact  on  IQ  scores,  they  had  significant  long -term  benefits  on 
education  attainment,  employment  outcomes  and  anti -social  behaviour.  Rolnick  and 
Grunewald (2003) report the real internal rate of return on the Perry Preschool programme is 
4% to the participant and 12% to society for a total return of 16%. UK programmes are more 
                                                           
13 In Becker and Tomes genetic an cultural influences are discussed interchangeably and combined into a single 
inherited endowment which parents cannot influence. They simply choose the optimal level of investment for a 
given endowment.  
14 See Heckman (2008). 
15 See Almond and Currie (2009) and Chuna, Heckman, Lochner and Masterov (2005) for full accounts of how 




recent and so the assessments are less robust. Sure Start, which combines childcare, health 
and family support and part-time education for 3-4 year olds has had cautiously positive 
assessments although programmes targeted at high risk areas appears have more impact.
16 
The Incredible Years Programmes, which targets families with pre-school children showing 
anti-social behaviour with a six month series of weekly clinics , are also reported to show 
positive results.
17 
Interventions in adolescent years are also successful. Studies of mentoring programmes in the 
US  using  random  selection  show  schemes  have  delivered  improved  attainment  and 
behavioural outcomes. Participants in Big Brothers/Big Sisters (a mentoring scheme for over 
90 years) after eighteen months delivered improved outcomes in truancy, school grades and 
better  relationships  with  parents.
18  The  channels  by  which  mentors  influence  mentees 
depends on the type of programme, but for youth mentoring it is reported to be through 
motivation and attitude as much as instruction. There is no comparable UK mentoring results 
using randomised selection. Aim Higher is similar in that it aims to raise awareness and 
aspirations of school children underrepresented in tertiary education. Goodman  and Gregg 
(2010) report a positive impact on GCSEs and enrolment rates. The evidence on returns to 
late adolescent and adult intervention (such as prisoner rehabilitation, adult education) is less 
favourable. In the UK the Train-to-Gain job training programme subsidises training for the 
low skilled is found to show low returns and a high degree of deadweight loss. While cost -
benefit assessments are not consistent across interventions, there appears to be an efficiency 
trade-off in favour of early interventions for disadvantaged children.
19 
2.2 Early Child Development and Credit Constraints 
While cross-discipline research has created a framework which emphasises the particular 
importance of early development, this does not explain why richer families, on avera ge, 
achieve higher levels of ECD. One explanation is that poorer families with young children 
face credit constraints at that stage which prevent them from delivering the necessary inputs. 
This is a re-interpretation of Becker and Tomes rationale for credi t constraints: rather than 
                                                           
16 See NESS (2008) for a discussion of the results. 
17 See Goodman and Gregg (2010). 
18 Tierney and Grossman findings are reported in Heckman (2008). 




parents  being  unable  to  borrow  against  their  child‟s  future  income  (an  inter-generational 
constraint) parents may not be able to borrow against their own future income (an intra-
generational constraint).
20 The root cause of the co nstraint is not be the limitation of the 
child‟s future earnings as a form of collateral but the quality of the parents‟ future earnings as 
collateral. This would imply different ethical and policy implications. 
Caucutt and Lochner (2004) measure the importance of differences in the timing of parent 
income  by  compiling  annual  family  income  histories  for  parents  of  the  US  National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth members since their children's birth after 1979. This enables 
them to test whether differences in children‟s test scores at 5-14 years are correlated with 
parental income at that age. They find that differences in income at early ages have a larger 
impact than differences at later ages on later attainment levels. If $10,000 of parent income 
could be shifted from when the child is 10 years old to when they are one year old this would 
lead to a 0.01 to 0.02 standard deviation increase in test scores. They also show that the slope 
of the family income profile over twenty years, but controlling for the same present value of 
life-cycle income, is negatively correlated with early attainment levels. This implies young 
children of parents who have low initial income (but the same life-time incomes) have lower 
levels of development. This is consistent with intra-generational credit constraints. 
If indeed early family income is a causal influence on early attainment which, in turn, is 
important for later attainment levels, an intriguing question is what the additional income 
buys to enable this improved performance. Expressed another way, which inputs into child‟s 
early ability production function are (temporarily) low income parents unable to finance? 
There are differences in infant or junior schools across catchment areas but this is likely to 
reflect differences in permanent income between families and even in aggregate books and 
other inputs would not involve a high level of borrowing. When children are young all levels 
of family spending is mediated by parents, so it is unclear whether it is the resources or the 
quality of parents which is the scarce resource. 
Goodman and Gregg (2010) present a detailed study of differences in home environments 
between affluent and poor families  which correlate with  differences  in  attainment  levels. 
They observe that differences in health (breast fed, birth weight), interactions, regularity of 
routines, learning environment (reading, teaching, taking to library etc) are all important in 
                                                           




explaining differences in attainment. Yet it is not clear that income is such an important 
factor in delivering this environment as few of the factors cost significant sums of money. 
They also add intriguingly that a larger proportion of the gap between affluent and poor 
children scores is left unexplained by these factors. 
2.3 Family Culture as a Causal Variable 
The importance of family culture on child development is widely recognised. Becker and 
Tomes (1986) acknowledge that “both biology and culture are transmitted from parents to 
children,  one  encoded  in  DNA  and  the  other  in  a  family‟s  culture.”
21 Having  made  this 
distinction, they combined genetics and culture into a single endowment transmitted across 
from parent to child. Parents cannot influence a child‟s fixed endowment, so the influence of 
family  culture  on  outcomes  or  in  shaping  the  expression  of  genes  is  excluded  from  the 
analysis. This negates the importance of the family in shaping non-cognitive skills essential 
for success at school. Bowles and Gintis (1976) recognise that “perseverance, dependability 
and consistency are the most important predictors of grades in school,”
22  
The importance of family culture in ECD is also recognised across a wide range of related 
child development disciplines. Psychologists refer to informal rules and codes of behaviour in 
families  as  culture  which  is  similar  to  an  economist‟s  interpretation  of  the  family  as  an 
institution where rules and codes condition behaviour of its members through beliefs and 
preferences. Shweder et al. (1998) recognise the importance of integrating both beliefs and 
behaviours into family culture as  “beliefs and doctrines make it possible for a people to 
rationalise and make sense of the life they lead” and “patterns of behaviour that are learned 
and passes on from generation to generation”.
23 Shonkoff and Phillips‟s (2000) review of 
early  child  development  recognise  family  culture  as  encompassing  “values,  aspirations, 
expectations and practices” providing a “virtual how-to manual for rearing children”.
24 
Several recent theory papers have considered how culture can be transmitted within a family. 
Laibson (1996) suggests that parents can influence the time preferences of their children to 
encourage longer term choices. This idea is explored further in Burton, Phipps and Curtis 
                                                           
21 Becker and Tomes (1986) p.S4. 
22 Quoted in Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and Masterov (2005) p.21. 
23 Quoted in Shonkoff and Phillips (2000) p.59. 




(2002) strict parents engage in strategies and the child is rewarded for delayed gratification. 
Bisin and Verdier (2000) show selective marriage of partners with similar cultural traits can 
lower  the  cost  of  diffusing  religious  culture  into  the  preferences  of  children.  Similarly, 
Tabellini (2008) show how parents inculcate their own attitudes and values of good conduct 
into their children which creates the possibility of cooperative outcomes. Benabou and Tirole 
(2006)  present  a  signalling  model  where  „belief  in  a  just  world‟  promotes  goal  oriented 
behaviour.  Children  form  beliefs  about  the  reward  to  effort  from  signals  transmitted  by 
parents, which parents manipulate to create a game between parent and child. 
There are many dimensions of family culture which influence the behaviour of children. In 
the transmission on inequality literature Osborne-Groves (2005) estimated that around one-
quarter of the correlation in income between fathers and sons is explained by the transmission 
of personality traits.
25 Yet traits cover a vast range of possible behaviours from perseverance 
and motivation to mental disorder. One particularly influential dimension of culture is the 
„belief  in  a  just  world‟  (BJW)  idea  proposed  by  Lerner  in  1965.  The  essence  is  that 
“individuals have a need to believe that they live in a world where people generally get what 
they deserve. Without such a belief it would be difficult for the individual to commit himself 
to the pursuit of long range goals or to the socially regulated behaviour of day to day life”.
26 
This concept of „belief in a just world‟ is closely related to an interpretation of fairness of the 
reward from effort. This captures an important aspect of family culture as it enables a child to 
commit to the pursuit of long-term goals which is essential for attainment (see earlier quotes 
from Bowls and Gintis (1978)). As will be shown in Section 4, the questions which make up 
the BJW measure  are specifically not  related or conditioned on  children or the value of 
education but are about the workplace. This is important to prevent reverse causality where 
parents believe education is important based on the ability or perceived success of their child. 
The idea that efforts are rewarded is integral to family culture and can be seen as an input by 
which  non-cognitive  skills  are  transmitted  from  parents  to  children  which  becomes  an 
important cause of later attainment.
27 
                                                           
25 Osborne-Grove is contained in Bowles, Gintis and Groves Eds. (2005). 
26 Lerner and Miller (2008) p.1030. 
27 The aim of Goodman and Gregg (2010) is to investigate the importance of parent and child attitudes, but they 
are clear to point out that the analysis cannot have a causal interpretation because of reverse causality. The 




3.  TRANSMISSION OF BELIEFS AND EDUCATION ATTAINMENT 
This section presents a model in which the beliefs of parents or other influential adults have 
an identifiable effect on children's early levels of attainment. The purpose is to formulate 
testable hypothesis for the empirical analysis in section 4. This presentation has three stages. 
First,  the  mechanisms  by  which  beliefs  are  transmitted  from  parent  (assumed  to  be  the 
influential adult) to child and how human capital is accumulated are set out. Second, the child 
and  parent  optimisation  problems  are  set  out  with  optimal  conditions  and  the  relevant 
comparative  statics  presented.  Third,  the  implications  of  incomplete  capital  markets  for 
identification issues and some stylised regression functions are presented. 
This model has the same parent and child preferences as Becker and Tomes (1986). Parent 
decision making is by consensus with one-sided altruism (children are not altruistic towards 
their parents) to rule out strategic games. The resource allocation problem is also unchanged 
so parents who are „rich enough and altruistic enough‟ and so have no need to borrow decide 
how much to invest in their child‟s education and how much to leave as a financial transfer. 
The structure of childhood is in the spirit of a dynamic ECD model similar to Cuhna et al. 
(2005). Becker and Tomes assumption of a single inherited aggregate endowment of genetic 
and  cultural  attributes  is  discarded  to  allow  these  attributes  to  be  transmitted  separately. 
Consistent with the findings of neurologists the attributes interact.
28 This different assumption 
creates two  distinctions to the Becker and Tomes model. First, there are two periods of 
childhood in the life cycle and two parent transmissions in the form of a beliefs signal and 
later investment in their education. Second, because the transmission of  beliefs requires a 
learning process, the child also makes a decision in response to the belief signal received.  
The overlapping generations model in figure 2 shows the two parts of childhood in the life 
cycle and the timing of  the transfers. At the start of the first period the child is born and 
inherits some natural ability from parents   (assumed to be genetic). They then receive a 
signal of family beliefs    which is described as parents' „belief in a just world‟. The child 
then forms an expectation of the return to effort on the basis of this signal and chooses how 
much effort  e to apply at school given their learning capability  ()  which is an increasing 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
GCSEs, and the child‟s own assessment of their ability and the importance of school. These questions make 
clear that causation cannot be interpreted to run solely from attitudes to attainment. 
28 See Shonkoff and Phillips (2000) on how the nature versus nurture debate is obsolete as nature and nurture 




function of inherited ability. In the second period of childhood parents observe this effort and 
invest in their child's education, similar to Becker and Tomes. When education is complete 
the child becomes an adult and possibly receives a bequest and sells their human capital to 
generate income for consumption and investment in their own children. 
Figure 2: Overalpping Generations: Two Period Childhood 
 
This two-step childhood goes some way to meeting the criteria of Cunha et al. (2005) for a 
model of human capital to be consistent with evidence from child psychologists (see section 
2). With two stages in the development of human capital (signal/response and investment) 
this is more of an accumulation rather than a production process. It is also ontological, in that 
parents create a reality for the child which they fulfil irrespective of its consistency with true 
or „real world‟ circumstances. 
3.1 Family Beliefs and a Model of Human Capital Production 
In this paper the key dimension of family culture is parents‟ beliefs of how effort is rewarded, 
summarised by their `belief in a just world'. The transmission of beliefs shapes their child's 
own early beliefs and expectations and influences their behaviour, such as how much effort to 
apply at school. If parents believe effort is fairly rewarded, this is transmitted by their attitude 
and  behaviour  to  their  child  who  is  likely  to  respond  by  trying  harder  at  school.  The 
identifying assumption is that these beliefs are „slow-moving‟ in parenthood; parents cannot 
simply change their core beliefs to manipulate their child's behaviour over a number of years. 
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A child's ability is summarised by an affine function (4) of natural ability α (where b is a 
parameter) and a choice of effort e times the true, but unknown, payoff to effort  . A young 
child has little or no experience of how closely effort and rewards are matched in the „real 
world‟  beyond  the  influence  from  their  family.  Therefore,  they  form  an  expectation 
conditional on family culture based on their parents' beliefs of the return to effort. Parents' 
beliefs are transmitted by a signal    which may be transmitted verbally, or through their 
attitude  at  home  or  even  by  a  child  observing  parents'  responses  to  incentives.  Using 
signalling technology from Benabou and Tirole (2005) and others, a child's expectation of the 
return to effort is conditional on parents' beliefs transmitted through the family belief system. 
The signal of a parent who believes the return to effort is either high or low is described in 
equation (5). Children with parents who believe the return to effort is high will themselves 
tend to form high expectations. 
Children do not always follow parent's guidance and there is a cost to applying effort. The 
cost function shown in equation (6) can be interpreted as the energy spent concentrating or 
the opportunity cost of studying and not playing games. The function is convex, so the cost of 
an  extra  hour  of  effort  increases.  The  cost  is  scaled  by  a  measure  of  a  child's  learning 
capability ()  , which is an increasing function of natural ability. A child with a favourable 
endowment of natural ability is likely to have a greater learning capability and so a lower cost 
to effort. This is another distinction from Becker and Tomes by allowing genetic and cultural 
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The  human  capital  accumulation  function (7)  has  two  differences  to  Becker  and  Tomes' 
formulation.  First,  a  parameter  P  is  included  to  reflect  parent's  ability  to  develop  human 
capital at home. This performs a similar function to Hicks neutral technological progress as it 




capital across families. Second, the ability of the child is an optimal response to the child's 
optimisation problem (indicated by the asterisk) and is created before any investment. This 
generates a two stage process where the transmission of family beliefs at an early stage and 
investment at a later stage. The cross partial shows that investment is a complement to ability. 
This means that the return to a given level of investment will be higher for a higher level of 
ability or early development in response to affirmative beliefs in a just world. Because the 
Inada conditions apply to the function, there is always a positive level of investment and it is 
assumed that parents only leave net bequests.
29 The wage function is the same as Becker and 
Tomes where the labour income is the product of the stock of human capital and the return on 
a unit of human capital W  or the real wage plus risk  .  
3.2 Child and Parent Optimisation Problems 
The child and parent optimisation problems are set out below. In each case the optimality 
conditions  are  presented  which  are  then  used  in  comparative  statics  to  highlight  the 
development  from  Becker  and  Tomes.  As  an initial  reference  point,  capital  markets  are 
assumed to be complete so parents can borrow on behalf of their child to fund an optimal 
level of investment in their human capital which the child then repays in adulthood. 
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A child's response to their cultural environment means that they are active in developing their 
own ability, a point emphasised in Shonkoff and Phillips (2000). This is characterised by 
their choice of effort e described in equation (9). The objective function is a standard value or 
utility function increasing in ability, which can be interpreted as the utility or value of better 
test  scores  or  even  recognising  that  greater  ability  will  lead  to  more  consumption  in 
adulthood. That additional effort comes at ever greater cost ensures an internal solution. The 
equilibrium conditions reflect a child's optimal level of effort in (10) and their optimal ability 
                                                           
29 A net bequest means that a gross bequest is made only if parents can afford to optimally invest in their child‟s 




in (11). Note that the choice of effort is on the basis of the expected return while ability is a 
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The comparative statics in equations (12)-(14) show that a child's ability is an increasing 
function of family beliefs, their natural characteristics and the interaction between them. The 
cross partial in (14) is a reflection of recent physiological evidence discussed in section 2 that 
genes have a degree of malleability and interact with the environment. This captures Knudsen 
et al. (2006) point (a) in section 2.1 above.  
The  parent's  optimisation  problem  is  very  similar  to  Becker  and  Tomes  except  that 
investment occurs after the child has chosen their optimal level of effort. Parents are altruistic 
and take account of future generations described in (15) where 0< <1 measures the degree 
of parent altruism. The objective function (15) shows that parents‟ welfare depends on their 
own utility and the altruism discounted utility of their child. The choice variable is the size of 
financial transfer T which may be through investment 
p I  or bequest  B  as shown in equation 
(16).  The  inequality  shows  one-sided  altruism  so  children  do  not  make  net  transfers  to 
parents. The total investment  I in a child‟s human capital or education can be financed by 
parent resources or debt if they are not „rich enough or altruistic enough and capital markets 
allow such borrowing. The pooled family budget constraint (18) indicates that capital markets 
are complete and there is full resource and risk sharing. 
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Parents' optimisation leads to the usual two optimality conditions of the Euler equation (19) 
and optimal investment condition (20). Even though transfers must be positive and there are 
complete capital markets, the Euler condition need not hold with equality if parents are not 
„rich  enough  and  altruistic  enough‟  and  so  full  risk  sharing  may  not  occur.  However, 
complete capital markets ensure that the optimal investment rule (20) applies and investment 
in their child's development is independent of parents‟ income and preferences. The implicit 
function of optimal investment is presented in equation (21) in which parent income is not an 
argument. 
(19) 
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There are four comparative statics with respect to a child's educational attainment. The first 
two enter the parent's optimisation problem and are identical to the Becker and Tomes model. 
It is useful to repeat these results in advance of the empirical analysis in section 4. 
(22) 
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First, if a parent receives an increase in income, what is the effect on the child's education? 
Assuming that the income is a shock   , and since parent income does not enter (21) then 
there is no impact on the optimal level of education. Parents will share the greater income to 
maintain the Euler condition. If parents borrow to invest in their child's human capital they 
may transfer resources by increasing the amount of they invest and reduce the debt. This is 
illustrated  in  equation (22).  But  since  the  rate  of  return  is  the  same  in  complete  capital 
markets, this has no effect on the level of human capital. Parents who are „rich enough and 
altruistic enough‟ to not rely on debt will transfer resources to their children through larger 
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Second, what is the effect of an increase in interest rates on educational attainment? As with 
any standard inter-temporal models an increase in interest rate creates an income, substitution 
and  a  human  capital  effect  and  the  net  balance  of  these  to  forces  cannot  be  established 
without more information on preferences.
30 However, the impact on education shown by the 
total  derivative  in   (23)  is  negative.  This  is  because  there  is  an  alternative  investment 
opportunity (bequest) where the return on financial investments has increased resulting in a 
substitution from investing in education and towards leaving a bequest. The lower level of 
investment raises the marginal return to investing in education until the optimal condition  
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The third and fourth comparative statics relate to variables which lead to an initial change in a 
child's behaviour followed by a response by their parent. As they have similar arguments they 
are presented together.  An increase in the family beliefs signal in equation (24) leads to 
higher human capital both directly through a higher level of ability (as per equation (12) and 
also indirectly through the increase in later complementary investment. However, the size of 
the impact depends on the change in expected return to effort from the increase in cultural 
signal. There is no need for this to be linear (and may in fact be concave). It also depends on 
learning capability and the true return which is a common factor. Similarly an increase in 
natural ability leads to direct and indirect effects and higher human capital. The size of this 
effect depends on how learning capability improves with natural or inherited ability and also 
family culture. 
                                                           




The comparative static (24) can also be seen as the return to mentoring. If a mentor succeeds 
in raising a child‟s beliefs, then the improvement in human capital will depend on the extent 
to which this occurs and the child‟s learning ability. The more the child updates their own 
expectation then the more effective will be the mentoring in terms of higher levels of human 
capital. 
In this model low levels of family beliefs transmitted to children also create a self-fulfilling 
outcome of lower levels of human capital. This is the static cost in terms of one generation. If 
the low levels of human capital and low income as adults are interpreted as justifying the 
family culture then there is a dynamic effect through following generations. The persistence 
of culture across generations may explain why poorly educated parents who believe they 
mean the best for their children accept sub-optimal investment (from a social perspective) in 
their children even though there is no cost in their early years in repeated family games.
31  
3.3 Incomplete Capital Markets and Identification 
The key comparative static of interest to this section is  (24) which is derived assuming that 
capital markets are complete. The   issue of how this result would change if markets are 
incomplete comes down to the responsiveness of investment for an increase in optimal ability 
* ()
K IA  . If credit constraints are binding and all investment is funded by parents with no 
borrowing then the responsiveness of investment to a change in beliefs will be less than in 
complete  markets.  As  ability  raises  the  marginal  return  to  investment, parents  re-allocate 
resources towards investment to meet the Euler condition. This raises the marginal rate of 
substitution  or  shadow price  of  investment  resulting  in  both  a  lower  level  and  a  smaller 
change (smaller derivative) in human capital. This can be thought of as crowding-out. Those 
effected are parents who face hard constraints or soft constraints but fund the investment 
themselves. In this circumstance, attainment in a function of income. Where parents cannot 
afford to invest their own resources and rely on borrowing on the child's behalf, there is no 
change in the cost of credit and so for homothetic functions the change in human capital is 
the same as families who are unconstrained. 
 
                                                           




Figure 3: Family beleifs, credit constraints and Indetification 
 
Unpacking  Becker  and  Tomes'  single  endowment  into  natural  ability  and  family  beliefs 
means that differences in early attainment may not be simply due to credit constraints or 
inherited ability but also family culture as emphasised in the child development literature. 
Applying this model to data raises two significant identification problems. The first is to 
distinguish between low levels of investment in human capital which may be either optimal 
from a parent's perspective due to low child ability from poor family beliefs or due to the 
existence of credit constraints. The identification problem is illustrated in figure  3 above 
where the reason for the low level of investment is ambiguous. In figure 3 this is indicated by 
* ( ( , )) ( ( , ))
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LH I r I     where  the  superscripts  indicate  optimal  and  credit  constrained 
investment respectively. Poor family culture together with complete markets may create the 
same level of investment as good family culture but with credit constraints (where r   ). A 
corollary is that previous studies which exclude family culture are likely to have omitted 




The implicit functions (26) and (27) show differences in human capital, which in this instance 
is measured by early test scores. In addition to a proxy for family culture, other relevant 
variables are a measure of natural ability (inherited with error from parents), parenting ability 
and a measure of a child's learning capability. All of these variables follow from the model. 
The  function  (27)  includes  parent  income  as  the  parents  are  assumed  to  be  credited 
constrained  and  fund  the  investment  themselves.  Since  (26)  is  nested  within  (27)  the 
significance of the income terms can be estimated. If the income coefficient is not statistically 
significant with the inclusion of the beliefs variable, this suggests that differences in income 
contain no further explanatory power of differences in early test scores and therefore no 
evidence of credit constraints. 
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A deeper identification problem is if family culture or beliefs reflects an expectation of future 
credit constraints. If, for example, parents rely on debt for any investment in their child's 
education then the child may be discouraged from responding to a positive belief system as 
they do not intend to encourage parents to take-on more debt on their behalf to be repaid in 
adulthood. Similarly, if parents are not „rich enough and altruistic enough‟ to invest optimally 
then they may opt for a weak belief signal knowing that in adolescence they will under invest 
because  of  credit  constraints.  For  example,  if  parents  believed  that  tertiary  education  is 
simply too expensive then they may transmit a weak cultural signal. It is the expectation of 
being credit constrained which leads to a weaker belief signal. Since these issues cannot be 
fully  disentangled,  the  identifying  assumption  is  that  family  culture  is  slow-moving  and 
hence does not simply reflect expectations of credit constraints. This would create parents 
with different beliefs in a just world depending on the issue and hence create the potential for 
cognitive dissonance. 




4.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This section presents empirical evidence on family culture as a causal influence on children‟s 
early test scores. This is carried out in three stages. First, a summary of two special studies in 
the 1991 National Child Development Survey (NCDS) follow-up survey is provided and the 
estimation strategy outlined. The follow-up studies enable a panel to be constructed linking 
the early economic and social circumstances of cohort members and their later beliefs (family 
culture)  to  the  cognitive  test  scores  of  their  children.  Second,  the  hypothesis  that  parent 
beliefs are a causal factor in early attainment scores is tested with the data. Of particular 
relevance  is  the  impact  on  income  as  an  explanatory  variable  and  the  inferences  about 
incomplete capital markets. Finally, the robustness of parent beliefs is assessed, whether they 
are a conduit for other directly observable measures of parent behaviour and what might 
explain the causal mechanism. All the data used in the chapter are presented in annex 1. 
4.1 Two special studies from the NCDS dataset 
The fifth NCDS follow-up in 1991 (when the cohort member was aged 33) includes two 
special  studies  particularly  useful  for  this  application.  The  first  includes  information  on 
cognitive and non-cognitive skills of children randomly selected from one-third of cohort 
members. This creates a sample of 4,227 children, an equal numbers of boys and girls, from 
2,587 separate families. The child ages range from 216 new-born children to 341 teenagers, 
with 60% between four and eleven. One drawback of this study is that at the 33 years old 
many cohort members have not have completed their families. This may introduce some 
sample bias as economically successful adults often have children later. These NCDS cohort 
members‟ children are the sample for this study. Note that because all of the regressions 
contain child test scores and parent beliefs (the variables of interest) and the same set of child 
and parent controls, the sample is reduced from 4,227 to a maximum of 2,050 observations. 
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Functions  (3.26)  and  (3.27) are  approximated  by  linear  in  parameters  sample  regression 




The absence of subscripts on the coefficients implies that children respond homogeneously to 
explanatory variables. The OLS estimator can therefore be interpreted as an average causal 
effect. The estimation strategy is a similar reduced form procedure to Tomes (1984). The key 
is the selection of explanatory variables. No explanatory variable is chosen by the child, the 
parent  explanatory  variables  are  not  conditioned  on  the  ability  of  the  child  and,  most 
importantly, the key beliefs variable of interest is specifically not with reference to the child. 
The  main  cognitive  test  used  in  this  analysis  is  the  Peabody  Picture  Vocabulary  Survey 
(PVSS) which measures verbal intelligence. This is list of 175 words of increasing difficulty 
and the child selects one of four pictures which bests describes the word‟s meaning. While 
the test is designed for children over three, in the NCDS it is only completed by children over 
four years old. The Piat Individual Achievement Tests (PIAT) are also used in the analysis. 
These cover three separate fields: reading recognition, comprehension and mathematics and 
were completed by children 6 years and older. All scores are normed on age so the mean test 
score is 100 and standard deviation 15. As the median age of child who sat the PVSS test is 
8.25 years old, the results are an early measure of education attainment. 
The second special study contains information on cohort members‟ beliefs and attitudes on 
various social and economic issues. Responses are used to create a measure of family culture. 
The dimension of family culture relevant to this study is the extent to which cohort members 
believe that people “get what they deserve”. This is measured by adding the responses to 
three statements in table 1 into a “belief in a just world” (BJW) measure. Responses are from 
1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree), so positive readings are consistent with a belief 
that effort is fairly rewarded, or people generally get what they deserve. Parents‟ responses to 
the survey are given before the child‟s test score is known and relate to returns to work. 
While  it  is  conceivable  that  the  progress  of  their  child  influences  their  parents‟  beliefs, 
whether this would lead a parent to respond differently to these statements is doubtful. The 
measure is normalised (mean zero and unit standard deviation) to assist interpretation. 
Table 1  Questions used to Construct BJW Beliefs Metric 
1.  Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers 
2.  Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance 
3.  Ordinary working people do not get a fair share of the nation‟s wealth 




The identifying assumption in this paper is that family culture is a slow-moving institution. 
While this does not preclude belief formation being a gradual learning process over time, it 
requires  that beliefs at  least  not  updated lock-step with  changes  in  economic and family 
circumstances. A measure of the extent to which beliefs are slow-moving can be seen from 
the transition probabilities between the 1991 and 2000 surveys in Table 2 below. The cell 
entries show the transition probabilities between sextile rankings between 1991 and 2000. For 
example, the probability of being in the lowest sextile in 1991 and then the lowest sextile in 
2000 is 37.6% and the probability of moving from the lowest ranking to the highest in nine 
years is only 2.8%.  
Table 2: Transition Probabilities of BJW between 1991 and 2000 NCDS Surveys 
2000\1991  1  2  3  4  5  6  Total 
1  37.6  21.4  16.7  12.1  10.4  1.8  100.0 
2  20.9  18.4  21.2  18.3  17.2  4.0  100.0 
3  15.4  16.8  18.7  21.1  23.6  4.4  100.0 
4  9.4  12.1  17.9  13.8  29.7  7.1  100.0 
5  6.0  7.9  13.0  20.4  37.6  15.2  100.0 
6  2.8  4.4  6.9  11.4  38.1  36.5  100.0 
Total  19.4  15.0  15.9  20.0  23.4  9.32  100.0 
Source: NCDS sweeps 5 and 6 
As well as attainment and parental beliefs the regression functions show other variables to be 
included in the estimation in accordance to the model presented in section  3. Two measures 
of parents‟ natural ability are considered. The first comprises of three tests at 7 years of age 
covering maths, reading and drawing. Principal component analysis shows that the maths and 
reading tests have similar patterns and the first component explains 77% of the total variation 
in both series. The second measure is a General Ability test taken at 11 years of age and 
similar to an IQ test. The earlier test scores are taken as a better measure of inheritable ability 
on  the  basis  that  any  tests  taken  around  11  years  of  age  are  likely  to  be  influenced  by 




Parenting ability in the context of child attainment is usually proxied for by including parent 
qualifications. A thirteen point categorical variable showing the level of education of the 
cohort member is included in all of the regressions. More qualified parents will be in a better 
position to  teach their  child to  be successful  in attainment  tests  and possibly have more 
interest in doing so. The cost to a child of learning may be shaped by the cultural messages 
they receive in the family. In order to make this distinction, the cost is considered to be due to 
physical reasons and an indicator variable is included to show if the child has significant 
health problems affecting school attendance or requiring ongoing medical attention. 
The measurement of income and resources is central to this study. Long term consumption 
and investment decisions are likely to be taken on the basis of expected life time resources 
rather than income at a single point in time. Current income can have measurement error 
which  bias  estimates  toward  zero.  Several  measures  of  family  income  and  assets  were 
considered and over different time periods. This is especially the case since both the 1981 and 
1991 surveys took place during recessions when unemployment is likely to be temporarily 
high.  Net family income is the most relevant measure. The top and bottom percentiles are 
dropped to avoid any bias as a result of leveraged observations. Family income reported at 
the same time as the attainment tests and beliefs were reported is used as a benchmark, 
although an earlier family income is also reported to reflect on the findings of Caucutt and 
Lochner (2005). Asset values were also considered in both surveys. While they are often 
significant there are concerns around measurement. Following Michael (2002) a categorical 
wealth  variable  is  constructed  based  on  the  number  of  utilities  at  the  parent  or  cohort 
member's home. This is similar to the wealth variable described in Annex 1. 
Family income is not necessarily a good indicator of parents‟ investment in children. To 
capture parents‟ preferences for investment for a given amount of resources two categorical 
data series showing how many books the child owns and how often the parent reads to their 
child are considered. These are direct measures of parent investment in their children. A 
measure of parent involvement in school activities was also considered but with little impact 
on results. There is a high degree of co-linearity between books and reading, but including 
one measure is likely to be positively correlated with higher test scores. A final measure used 
is an index of home cognitive conditions which is based on the interviewers‟ observation of 




income. These variables are included in specific regressions, but as they lead to a loss in 
sample size by around one-third they are not included in the initial specifications. 
Three sets of controls variables contained in all the regressions. The first set takes account of 
child characteristics which may influence attainment levels but which are exogenous to the 
child. These include age (in months), sex, birth weight and whether they are a first child. The 
second set of controls describes the cohort member parent and their circumstances which are 
largely  unrelated  to  their  child  but  may  influence  attainment  levels.  These  include  sex, 
whether their parents were white, the mother was in their teens when the child was born and 
whether there are marital problems defined as  some form of separation. The final set of 
controls is the size of household to take into account the resources per head in each household 
and the region of residence to take account of differences in beliefs across regions. 
4.2 The Influence of Family Beliefs and Credit Constraints 
A reasonable initial requirement for family culture to be a causal influence on test scores is a 
significant  bi-variate  correlation.  Results  show  that  a  one  standard  deviation  increase  in 
family culture at the mean (or a 0.8 increase on a 1 to 5 point scale) leads to a 2.7% increase 
in test score and explains 3.3% of variation. To put this into context, a one standard deviation 
increase in annual family net income in 1981 (an increase of £2,513) leads to an increase of 
1.8% and a similar increase in family net income in 1991 (an increase of £5,418) leads to a 
1% increase in test scores. An alternative interpretation is that a one point increase in the 
BJW measure has the same impact on test scores as a 3 category improvement on a 13 point 
scale in the parent‟s level of education. Family culture passes this initial requirement. 
Table 3 assess the impact of the culture variable on the current family income coefficient. 
Column (1) is a human capital production function with early test scores as the dependent 
variable and family income as a significant explanatory variable. This suggests that parent 
income is a statistically significant predictor of test scores and that credit constraints may 
prevent optimal investment in the child. Column (2) includes the parent ability measured by 
the first principal component of math and reading tests at 7 years of age. This is economically 
and  statistically  significant  while  the  significance  of  the  income  coefficient  falls  below 
conventional thresholds. Since ability measured at age 7 is before any earnings, this cannot be 




The family culture BJW variable is included in column (3) and is also economically and 
statistically significant and the coefficient on income falls. Both results cast doubts on current 
parent  income  being  a  statistically  significant  variable.  The  final  column  includes  both 
culture and parental ability. The inclusion of income shows that the regression function (28) 
is  assumed  the  correct  specification  whereas  the  results  suggest  that  (29)  may  be  more 
appropriate. An interpretation of the results in column (4) is that a one point increase in 
beliefs leads to a 1.6% increase in BJW test scores and is statistically significant at 1%.  
Table 3: Regression Results of Early Test Scores on Beliefs controlling for Family Income 
(Dependent variable: Peabody Vocabulary Test Score) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  PVSS  PVSS  PVSS  PVSS 
BJW      1.321***  1.367*** 
      (3.6)  (3.57) 
Child health  -2.222**  -1.800*  -2.391**  -1.936*** 
  (2.41)  (1.92)  (2.53)  (2.02) 
Parent ability 1    1.746***    1.639*** 
    (5.51)    (4.95) 
Parent quals 5  1.126***  0.917***  1.035***  0.825*** 
  (11.15)  (8.14)  (9.69)  (6.96) 
Family 
Income5 
0.156*  0.109  0.134  0.083 
  (1.76)  (1.17)  (1.46)  (0.86) 
Constant  74.885***  76.629***  76.859***  78.618*** 
Observations  1764  1562  1682  1493 
R-squared  0.14  0.16  0.15  0.16 
OLS  estimates  with  robust  t  statistics  in  parentheses:  ***  shows  statistical  significance  at  1%,  **  shows 
statistical significance at 5% and * shows statistical significance at 10%. Each regression includes child controls 
for age, sex, birth weight and whether a first child and cohort member controls for sex, non-white, marital 
problems if teenage mother and region of residence. BJW is a standardised variable describing „belief in a just 
world‟. Family income5 is family net income measured in 1991 at the time of the tests.   
Further evidence on the role of income is presented in table 4. Column (1) includes the 
general  aptitude  test  measure  of  parental  ability.  This  has  the  dual  effect  of  making  the 
income variable statistically significant at the margin, and markedly reduces the size of the 
beliefs coefficient. The impact of a 1 point increase in beliefs is a 0.9% increase in test 
scores. This change in variable leads to the biggest fall in size of the coefficient of interest in 
all the results analysed. This issue is revisited in the robustness tests below. Column (2) 
includes family income in 1981 instead of 1991 which is economically and statistically more 
powerful. This is consistent with Caucutt and Lochner‟s (2005) that income even at the start 
of life has a higher significance on ECD outcomes than income received later in childhood. 




The derived family wealth variable in 1991 is included in columns (3) and (4) and is found to 
be statistically significant at 1%. The difference between the two results is the inclusion of 
the BJW culture variable in (4) column. While the wealth coefficient is still significant, it is 
reduced  by  around  one  quarter  by  the  inclusion  of  BJW  although  both  variables  are 
significant at 1%. It is difficult to interpret a stock variable such as wealth as indicative of a 
credit constraint as  this  reflects  the longer term  resourcefulness  of parents.  This  is  more 
consistent with the long run characteristics of the family rather than an inability to borrow or 
an  incomplete  capital  market  issue.  That  the  family  wealth  proxy  did  not  reduce  the 
coefficient on the culture variable suggests that it is not simply a proxy for unmeasured 
income or resources 
Table  4:  Regression  Results  of  Early  Test  Scores  on  Beliefs  with  an  Alternative  Parent 
Ability Measure and Controlling for Family Income and Wealth 
(Dependent variable: Peabody Vocabulary Test Score) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  PVSS  PVSS  PVSS  PVSS 
BJW  0.754*  1.617***    1.554*** 
  (1.93)  (4.64)    (4.79) 
Child health  -2.750***  -2.688***  -2.453***  -2.577*** 
  (2.81)  (3.07)  (3.10)  (3.18) 
Parent ability 1    1.886***  1.880***  1.727*** 
    (6.04)  (6.76)  (5.96) 
Parent ability 2  0.198***       
  (6.93)       
Parent quals 5  0.609***  0.733***  0.769***  0.699*** 
  (5.09)  (6.87)  (7.82)  (6.85) 
Family 
Income5 
0.157*       
  (1.65)       
Family 
Income4 
  0.278**     
    (2.32)     
Family 
Wealth5 
    1.043***  0.760*** 
      (3.88)  (2.71) 
Constant  69.561***  80.338***  76.840***  79.377*** 
Observations  1473  1848  2173  2075 
R-squared  0.17  0.16  0.17  0.17 
OLS  estimates  with  robust  t  statistics  in  parentheses:  ***  shows  statistical  significance  at  1%,  **  shows 
statistical significance at 5% and * shows statistical significance at 10%. Each regression includes child controls 
for age, sex, birth weight and whether a first child and cohort member controls for sex, non-white, marital 
problems if teenage mother and region of residence. BJW is a standardised variable describing „belief in a just 
world‟. Family income5 is family net income measured in 1991  and family income4 is family net income 
measured in 1981. In column (1) parent ability (2) is measured by a general aptitude test at 11. Wealth5 is a 




To investigate the importance of family income in the presence of family culture further, a 
similar exercise to the Carneiro and Heckman (2002) application in Annex 2 is reported in 
table 5 below. Families are divided into quartiles based on income and tertiles based on 
family culture. Each quartile is assigned a dummy variable where the highest income quartile 
is the base (dropped) dummy. Equation (30) describes the procedure where the coefficients of 
interest are on the income quartile dummies. The dependent variable is the PVSS test score 
and  the  controls  are  the  same  as  in  the  regression  tables.  This  equation  is  effectively 
estimated  for  each  tertile  of  family  culture.  F-tests  where  the  null  hypothesis  is  that  the 
income  dummy  coefficients  are  jointly  equal  to  zero  are  carried-out.  If  this  null  can  be 
rejected then this indicates that income is a statistically significant predictor of test scores, 
after taking account of differences in family culture.  
(30)  ,1 1 ,2 2 ,3 3
k p p p
b b b b H Y Y Y u X           
Panel A divides the sample based on family income in 1991 and panel B is based on family 
income in  1981. Families in  the highest  income quartile are denoted  as in  Q4. The  first 
column in both panels shows the results without control variables and without differentiating 
across  family  culture.  Three  lower  income  quartiles  are  compared  to  the  highest  income 
families and so lower test scores are indicated by negative signs. In both cases the F-tests 
indicate that the null hypothesis can be rejected at 1% significance level. This corresponds to 
the simple correlation between attainment levels and parent income noted at the start of the 
chapter. The second column in both panels marked 'conditional' includes the same controls 
used in the regression tables. Again the F-test indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at 
5% and 1% respectively. These results indicate that parent income is statistically significant 
predictor of test scores if family culture is not taken into account. 
Columns (3)-(5) carry out the same regression, but for each tertile of family culture on the 
basis of BJW responses (columns 3 and 5 are families with the lowest and highest responses 
respectively). Because the dependent variable is continuous the analysis does not allow a 
probabilistic comparison of the number who may be credit constrained. However, the results 
show that income in 1991 only matters for families with middle family culture. Put another 
way,  those  families  with  distinctive  family  cultures  are  unlikely  to  have  differences  in 
children‟s attainment scores which are due to family income. The F-test shows that only for 




using family income in 1981 shows that the only statistical differences are between the first 
and second highest income groups. The F-test shows that the null hypothesis that the dummy 
coefficients are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected. Taking the results of panel A and B 
together, after controlling for family culture only one group (1991 income and BJW tertile 2) 
shows that differences in family income remain an important influence on test scores. For the 





Table 5: NCDS cohort members' children's test scores PVSS by parental income and family culture (BJW) 
      Unconditional      Conditional     Culture tertile 1 (low)     Culture tertile 2 (mid)    Culture tertile 3 (high) 
     Beta  SE    Beta  SE    Beta  SE    Beta  SE    Beta  SE 
Panel A:  PVSS scores by family net income quartiles at time of exam (1991) and parent belief in a just world (1991) 
Q4-Q1 
 
-0.0961  0.0649 
 
-0.1314  0.0915 
 
0.1369  0.1693 
 
-0.3626***  0.1534 
 
-0.0035  0.1919 
Q4-Q2 
 
-0.3004***  0.0701 
 
-0.2360***  0.0835 
 
-0.0449  0.1425 
 
-0.4497***  0.1457 
 
-0.0710  0.1997 
Q4-Q3 
 
-0.0997  0.0766 
 
-0.0799  0.0769 
 
0.0459  0.1361 
 
-0.1253  0.1326 
 
-0.1275  0.1671 











Panel B:  PVSS scores by family net income quartiles at time of exam (1981) and parent belief in a just world (1981) 
Q4-Q1 
 
-0.2833***  0.0569 
 
-0.1509***  0.0603 
 
-0.1488  0.1170 
 
-0.0339  0.0960 
 
-0.1914  0.1199 
Q4-Q2 
 
-0.1753***  0.0558 
 
-0.0753  0.0578 
 
-0.0873  0.1170 
 
-0.0410  0.0891 
 
0.0037  0.1153 
Q4-Q3 
 
-0.2979***  0.0515 
 
-0.2134***  0.0542 
 
-0.2075**  0.1039 
 
-0.1986**  0.0848 
 
-0.1185  0.1176 
H0: all gaps = 0 
 
F(3,2448)=13.77***     F(3,1886)=5.67***     F(3,607)=1.45     F(3,711)=1.97     F(3,441)=1.13 
Note: ***statistically significant at 1%, **statistically significant at 5%, * statistically significant at 10%. BJW is the family culture measure. Controls include: 
region of school and child controls for age, sex, birth weight and whether first child and cohort member controls for sex, 
  non-white, marital problems and whether a teenage mother. 
                
 
4.3 Robustness of Family Culture a Predictor of Test Scores 
If parents are credit constrained then the amount of investment in their child‟s development 
will depend on their preferences expressed through the marginal rate of substitution. Since 
this may not be the same for all parents, a proxy for parent investment in their child is 
needed. A second justification for including a measure of investment is that beliefs might 
simply reflect an observable behaviour. For example, those who respond that they believe the 
world is just and that people are rewarded for effort may read to their children more often 
without any wider cultural influence. Table 6 includes three alternative measures of parent 
investment in their child. Column (1) is the same as column (4) in table 3 for reference. 
Column (2) includes a six point categorical variable of the number of books the child owns. 
As expected this reduces the significance of the income.  
Table 6: Regression Results of Early Test Scores on Beliefs with Measures of Parent Investment 
(Dependent variable: Peabody Vocabulary Test Score) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  PVSS  PVSS  PVSS  PVSS 
BJW  1.367***  1.493***  1.365***  1.708*** 
  (3.57)  (3.39)  (3.57)  (3.82) 
Child books    2.664***     
    (4.98)     
Parent Interest      0.076   
      (0.35)   
Child read        0.840** 
        (2.48) 
Child health  -1.936***  -2.055*  -1.932***  -1.933*** 
  (2.02)  (1.72)  (2.02)  (1.58) 
Parent ability 1  1.639***  1.473***  1.632***  1.741** 
  (4.95)  (3.32)  (4.92)  (3.94) 
Parent quals5  0.825***  0.598***  0.821***  0.674*** 
  (6.96)  (4.20)  (6.89)  (4.69) 
Family 
income5 
0.083  -0.049  0.083  -0.079 
  (0.86)  (0.44)  (0.86)  (0.70) 
Constant  78.618***  73.265***  78.511***  80.892*** 
Observations  1493  991  1493  987 
R-squared  0.16  0.18  0.16  0.17 
OLS  estimates  with  robust  t  statistics  in  parentheses:  ***  shows  statistical  significance  at  1%,  **  shows 
statistical significance at 5% and * shows statistical significance at 10%. Each regression includes child controls 
for age, sex, birth weight and whether a first child and cohort member controls for sex, non-white, marital 
problems if teenage mother and region of residence. BJW is a standardised variable describing „belief in a just 
world‟. Family income5 is family net income measured in 1991. In column (2) child books is a categorical 
variable for how many books the child owns, in column (3) parent interest is a categorical variable describing 
parental involvement with the school, and columns (4) child read is a categorical variable describing how often 




Column (3) includes a 7 point measure of the interest the parent takes in school activities, 
ranging  from  whether  they  attend  parent  evenings  to  becoming  a  school  governor. 
Surprisingly  this  has  no  significance.  Column  (4)  includes  a  six  point  measure  of  the 
frequency which parents read to their child. This also reduces the significance of income. If 
the  books  and  reading  variables  are  both  included  then  the  reading  variable  becomes 
redundant due to the high degree of co-linearity. Including the books or reading variables also 
leads to a large reduction in sample size.  
By including the measure of parent investment the size of the coefficients on family culture 
tend to become slightly larger suggesting that there is more to family culture than directly 
observable  parenting  behaviours.  This  is  consistent  with  the  interpretations  of  child 
psychologists discussed in section 2 who refer to culture as setting family values, aspirations 
and expectations. Buying books or reading to the child, while beneficial in terms of test 
scores, is not a substitute for family culture. Including the investment measures comes at a 
cost in terms of sample size and brings the risk of bias due to endogeniety as parents may be 
buying more books for children who work hard. The coefficients in column (2) indicate that a 
one point increase in BJW family culture at the mean is equivalent to a 1.8% increase in 
PVSS score.  
Robustness checks are presented in table A2 in Annex 1. Column (1) is a weighted least 
squares regression of column (2) in table 6 where outlier observations measured by a Cook‟s 
D test more than one are excluded from the sample. The remaining observations are weighted 
using  Huber-White  errors.  The  coefficient  on  the  family  culture  variable  is  higher  after 
adjusting for outliers. All the variables are listed in the table and the coefficient signs are as 
the model in section 3 predicts.  In column (2) the preferred measure of parent ability is 
replace for the general ability test score at 11 years old and introduced in table 4. While the 
size of the coefficient declines, an adjustment is required to take account of the units of the 
other variables. The BJW culture variable is significant at 5% and a one point increase at the 
mean  leads  to  1.3%  increase  in  test  score.  Column  (3)  re-introduces  the  family  wealth 
variable which is just significant at the usual thresholds and again leads to a larger rather than 
smaller culture coefficient. 
Two  further  robustness  tests  are  conducted.  First,  each  of  the  three  statements  used  to 




culture  measure.  Each  of  response  is  statistically  significant,  although  smaller  than  the 
aggregate measure (see Annex 1). This indicates that there is not one statement is driving the 
results. Second, three alternative test scores are considered as dependent variables. A single 
factor  from  a  principle  component  analysis  of  the  three  tests  is  used  as  the  dependent 
variable. This explains 76% of the variation in the three scores. The coefficient on the culture 
variable is marginally below the usual threshold with a p-value of 0.11. The culture variable 
is significant for reading but not in the comprehension or mathematics tests. Including family 
income  in  1981  raises  the  statistical  significance  of  the  culture  variable  above  the  usual 
thresholds in all but the comprehension test. 
Table 7:  Regression Results  of Early Test  Scores  on  Beliefs  and Measures  of Cognitive 
Support and Self Worth 
(Dependent variable: Peabody Vocabulary Test Score) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  PVSS  PVSS  PVSS 
BJW  1.367***  1.282***  0.47 
  (3.57)  (3.24)  (0.92) 
Home cognitive     0.071***   
    (5.18)   
Self Worth      1.176** 
      (2.57) 
Child health  -1.936**  -2.287***  -1.082 
  (2.02)  (2.38)  (0.88) 
Parent ability  1.639***  1.698***  1.660*** 
  (4.95)  (5.08)  (3.89) 
Parent quals 5  0.825***  0.714***  0.941*** 
  (6.96)  (5.75)  (5.72) 
Family Income5  0.083  -0.006  0.385*** 
  (0.86)  (0.06)  (2.82) 
Constant  78.618***  79.521***  76.840*** 
Observations  1493  1408  772 
R-squared  0.16  0.19  0.20 
OLS  estimates  with  robust  t  statistics  in  parentheses:  ***  shows  statistical  significance  at  1%,  **  shows 
statistical significance at 5% and * shows statistical significance at 10%. Each regression includes child controls 
for age, sex, birth weight and whether a first child and cohort member controls for sex, non-white, marital 
problems if teenage mother and region of residence. BJW is a standardised variable describing „belief in a just 
world‟. Family income5 is family net income measured in 1991 a the time of the tests.  
All of the regressions so far are reduced form, meaning that parental beliefs enter into the 
regressions rather than through variations in children‟s beliefs or efforts. Yet the model in 
section 3 shows that the transmission of culture requires a response from the child where they 




measure  of  home  cognitive  stimulus  based  on  the  interviewer‟s  assessment  of  home 
conditions. Researchers have suggested that this is another proxy for family resources. If this 
reduces the significance of the family culture variable then it would suggest that observing 
the change in child behaviour can be replaced by looking at the 'inputs' in the home. Column 
(1) is the same as reported in column (4) of table 3 for comparison. The cognitive score test is 
included in column (2) and is significant and appears correlated with family income but has 
minimal impact on the family culture coefficient. This suggests the effect of family culture 
may be through more channels than home inputs. 
As a proxy for the child‟s response to the culture signal a standardised variable measuring the 
child‟s perception of their self-worth is included in column (3). This is an imperfect way to 
get at the child‟s response to the family culture. If the culture is one where parents believe 
people are generally not rewarded for their efforts this may lead the child to have low self 
worth if there is a perception of little merit to effort. If this is a reasonable interpretation then 
the self worth measure would make the culture variable redundant. This is indeed found to be 
the case. There appears to be a link between family culture and children‟s self-worth which 
has a high degree of predictive value in early test scores. 





The  importance  of  family  culture  in  shaping  the  values,  aspirations  and  expectations  of 
children  has  long  been  recognised  by  child  psychologists.  Perhaps  because  'culture'  is 
ubiquitous and difficult to measure it has been omitted from econometric models of child 
development. Yet omitting key variables from the analysis is likely to introduce biases and, in 
this instance, may lead to false inferences about the role of credit constraints. This chapter 
presents a model to show how family culture is transmitted from parent to child and how a 
child optimally responds to cultural signals. This is described as an ontological model where 
the child's  action (based on family  culture)  creates their outcome, irrespective of reality, 
reflected in test scores and ultimately differences in educational and economic success. 
The  empirical  analysis  exploits  two  follow-up  surveys  from  the  NCDS  to  enable  cohort 
members' attitudes to be matched to a sample of their children's test scores. The dimension of 
family culture of interest, is cohort members' „belief in a just world‟, that is the extent to 
which they believe people generally get what they deserved in life. A measure was created 
from  cohort  members'  responses  to  attitude  statements.  While  all  attitudes  are  ultimately 
endogenous, the rate of transition suggests that this belief is slow-moving and therefore can 
be used as an explanatory variable. It is noteworthy that the response variable is determined 
by the child and the attitude by the parent. While there may be some reverse causation, this is 
unlikely  since  the  statements  relate  to  the  work  place  and  not  their  child.  The  Peabody 
Vocabulary Test Score is used as a benchmark of attainment.  
Without including the beliefs variable, family income is correlated with the test scores. Early 
family income appears a particularly powerful influence. This is consistent with Caucutt and 
Lochner's (2005) idea of early credit constraints. When the culture variable is included in the 
regression, the coefficients on income decline. In a detailed test of the role of income after 
taking account of family culture, there is evidence that income is an explanatory variable in 
only a limited sub-set of the sample. Early family income was not found to be statistically 
significant after taking account of family culture. It follows that excluding family culture 
from child attainment models is likely to lead to omitted variable bias and may lead to false 
inferences about credit constraints. 
Perhaps most surprising about this exercise is the size and robustness of the family culture 




beliefs (on a 1 to 5 scale) causes a 1.3% increase in test scores. This is larger than the gain in 
test scores for a standard deviation increase in income without any control variables. The use 
of  different  income  and  wealth  measures  and  proxies  for  family  investment  suggest  the 
culture variable is  not  a conduit for family  resources.  This  is  consistent  with  what  child 
psychologists suggest about beliefs and aspirations. One issue remain outstanding. While 
there  is  no  conclusive  way  to  show  how  parents‟  behaviour  affects  their  child,  more 
knowledge of the child‟s behavioural response would build a stronger case. The self-worth 
measure is an interesting start to this problem. 





The National Child Development Study (NCDS) is a longitudinal study of more than 17,400 
babies born in Great Britain in the week beginning 3
rd March 1958 (98% of all children born 
that week). After the initial perinatal mortality survey at birth, there has been eight follow-up 
survey sweeps collecting data on many aspects of cohort members‟ lives including education, 
family experiences and financial and economic circumstances.
32 The fourth and fifth sweeps 
in 1981 and 1991, when cohort members were 23 and 33, include supplementary surveys on 
attitudes and cognitive and non-cognitive tests on children from a random selection of one -
third of cohort members with children. These children of the cohort members are the sample 
used in the regressions in this paper. 
The data used in the analysis are summarised  in table A1 below with the exception of the 
regional controls. Because the regressions require test scores for cohort members (a parent) as 
well as their children (the sample) and attitudinal responses, the sample is limited to at most 
2,050. The „belief in a just world‟ measure is standardised in the regressions to assist in 
interpretation. The large skew in net family income in 1991 is problematic and has removed 
by dropping the first and last percentile observations in both income in 1981 and 1991. While 
this  has  a  cost  in  terms  of  sample  size,  the  resultant  descriptive  statistics  are  more 
representative. A family wealth variable is derived from the sum of indicator variables of 
whether the cohort member family has a phone, separate bathroom, own their home, have not 
claimed  welfare  and  have  savings  or  investments.  The  idea  is  to  create  a  measure  of 
accumulated wealth which may be more indicative of permanent income. This follows the 
methodology of Michael (2002) although applied to a different NCDS generation. 
Table  A2  includes  robustness  checks  and  the  full  results  with  the  exception  of  regional 
dummies for the model specified in table 6 in section 4. Column (1) is the same regression as 
column (2) in table 6 except that any influential variables with a Cook‟s D score above 1 are 
dropped and weighted least squares are used to account for observations with large residuals. 
Column (2) uses an alternative measure of parent ability (a general aptitude test taken at 11) 
which  reduces  the  size of  the  beliefs  variable  while  column  (3)  uses  the  derived  wealth 
variable discussed above in place of family net income. All statistically significant variables 
have the signs indicated by the model presented in section 3. 
                                                           




Table A1:  Summary of NCDS Data Used in Section 4 
  Obsv.  Max   Min  Mean   Median  SD  Skew 
Attitudinal responses               
Belief in just world   2050  5.00  1.00  2.58  2.67  0.81  0.22 
Support for work ethic   2028  5.00  1.00  2.80  2.67  0.80  0.11 
Left- right beliefs   2036  5.00  1.00  2.65  2.67  0.64  0.04 
CM’s child test scores               
Peabody vocabulary   2050  187  1.00  100.6  100.0  14.40  -0.13 
Peabody reading)  1785  174  47.0  100.6  101.0  14.94  0.08 
Peabody comprehension  1680  170  46.0  100.2  100.0  14.89  0.17 
Peabody mathematics    1774  187  36.0  100.6  100.0  14.98  0.14 
CM parent test scores                
Arithmetic (math) (age 7)  2050  10.0  0.00  5.07  5.00  2.40  0.11 
Reading (read) (age 7)  2050  30.0  0.00  23.6  26.0  6.62  -1.07 
General aptitude (cmiq) (age 11)  1847  79.0  5.00  43.5  45.0  15.5  -0.13 
CM parenting ability                
Books child owns  1349  6.00  1.00  5.16  5.00  0.88  -1.00 
Read to child  1346  6.00  1.00  4.52  5.00  1.43  -0.79 
CM qualifications 5  2050  13.0  0.00  4.65  4.00  3.45  0.64 
CM interest in school  2050  7.00  0.00  2.59  3.00  1.70  0.19 
Child learning ability               
CH Health problem  2050  1.00  0.00  0.19  0.00  0.39  1.61 
CM Income/wealth £‟000               
Family net income 4   1805  16.6  0.00  5.05  4.78  2.76  0.38 
Family net income 5   1503  686  0.94  10.1  7.68  25.7  24.3 
Family net income 5   1465  36.8  1.87  8.98  7.76  5.40  1.24 
Family assets 4   1805  80.0  -2.75  2.43  1.00  4.90  6.25 
Family assets 5  2037  341  -36.0  28.8  22.7  32.8  2.59 
Family wealth  2042  6.00  1.00  4.25  5.00  1.30  -0.60 
Child controls               
Age of child (months) (chage)  2050  224  47.00  104  99.00  36.61  0.46 
Sex of child (1=boy) (chsex)  2050  1.00  0.00  0.49  0.00  0.50  0.03 
Weight at birth (chweight)  2050  213  30.00  117  118.0  19.04  -0.35 
First child (chfirst)  2050  1.00  0.00  0.68  1.00  0.46  -0.80 
Child‟s self worth (standardised)   1083  1.59  -3.66  -0.00  0.14  1.01  -0.06 
CM controls               
Sex (cmsex)   2050  2.00  1.00  1.64  2.00  0.48  -0.58 
Marital problems 5 (cmmaritpr)  2050  2.00  0.00  0.42  0.00  0.80  1.42 
Non-white (cmethnic)  2050  1.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08  12.96 
Teenage mother (cmteenmum)  2050  1.00  0.00  0.14  0.00  0.35  2.06 
Household size (hhsize)  2050  6.00  0.00  4.29  4.00  0.96  -0.78 




Table A2: Regression Results of Early Test Scores on Beliefs with Robustness Checks 
(Dependent variable: Peabody Vocabulary Test Score) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  PVSS  PVSS  PVSS 
BJW  1.587***  1.042**  1.600*** 
  (3.50)  (2.41)  (4.31) 
Child health   -0.926  -2.891**  -2.266** 
  (0.87)  (2.50)  (2.26) 
Child books   2.778***  2.505***  2.987*** 
  (5.33)  (4.85)  (6.33) 
Parent ability 1  1.722***    1.299*** 
  (4.20)    (3.29) 
Parent ability 2    0.161***   
    (4.76)   
Parent quals5  0.524***  0.391***  0.496*** 
  (3.81)  (2.74)  (4.04) 
Family Income5  -0.053  0.039   
  (0.48)  (0.36)   
Family wealth5      0.581* 
      (1.66) 
Child age   0.054***  0.047**  0.067*** 
  (2.71)  (2.44)  (3.93) 
Child sex  2.336***  1.647**  1.637** 
  (2.86)  (1.97)  (2.25) 
Child birth weight  0.058***  0.063***  0.039** 
  (2.81)  (3.05)  (2.06) 
First child  1.526*  1.966**  2.516*** 
  (1.66)  (2.13)  (3.12) 
Parent sex  -0.218  0.635  0.167 
  (0.17)  (0.48)  (0.22) 
Parent marital probs  0.080  -0.856  -0.294 
  (0.13)  (1.31)  (0.50) 
Parent non-white   -6.663  -0.955  -10.007 
  (1.28)  (0.22)  (1.53) 
Parent teen mum  -3.810*  -3.189  -2.529 
  (1.78)  (1.40)  (1.45) 
Household size  0.234  0.135  0.258 
  (0.50)  (0.27)  (0.59) 
Constant  72.279***  66.166***  68.057*** 
Observations  991  970  1369 
R-squared  0.19  0.19  0.20 
OLS  estimates  with  robust  t  statistics  in  parentheses:  ***  shows  statistical  significance  at  1%,  **  shows 
statistical significance at 5% and * shows statistical significance at 10%. Each regression includes child controls 
for age, sex, birth weight and whether a first child and cohort member controls for sex, non-white, marital 
problems if teenage mother and region of residence. BJW is a standardised variable describing „belief in a just 
world‟.  Family  income5  is  family  net  income  measured  in  1991.  Column  (1)  is  a  weighted  least  squares 
regression with absolute t statistics in parenthesis. Parent ability2 is a general aptitude test at 11 years old and 





Blossfeld  and  Shavit  (1993)  report  a  persistent  correlation  between  parental  income  and 
children‟s  educational  attainment across time and countries  with  very  different  education 
systems. The key issue is whether income itself leads to higher attainment or whether there 
are other factors related to higher attainment which also explain higher income. An enormous 
amount of intellectual endeavour has been devoted to this important issue. Economists have 
generally interpreted this question as whether there are credit constraints which prevent low 
income parents from optimally investing in their children. This interpretation is consistent 
with Becker and Tomes (1986) which has been the economic paradigm in which much of the 
policy debate has been conducted.
33  
In an important paper, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) show that after taking account of early 
childhood attainment and family characteristics there is little  significant difference in across 
later attainment between families with different income levels. Family characteristics such as 
parents‟ education, marital status, number of siblings and regional location all correlate with 
long run family income and are reflected in early child ability. They argue that as differences 
in attainment can largely be explained by early childhood ability and indicators of long run 
family income there is little remaining to be explained by short term credit constraints at 
school leaving age.
34 This has shifted the debate from differences in education attainment at 
school leaving age or in college to explaining differences in early attainment levels. 
(A1)  ,1 1 ,2 2 ,3 3 1,2,3
k p p p
a a a a H X Y Y Y u a             
The  key  regression  in  Carneiro  and  Heckman  is (A1)  where  the  Y ‟s represent  indicator 
variables for quartiles of parent income rather than a continuous variable and the subscripts 
indicate the child‟s tertile of ability based on early test scores. In effect the regression is 
estimated  three  times  for  each  ability  tertile  and  the  highest  income  quartile  is  the  base 
(dropped) dummy variable. The    parameter measures the marginal change in attainment 
level for children in each income quartile relative to the highest quartile after controlling for 
differences in ability and long term family characteristics. The difference between parameter 
values is the unexplained or upper bound which might be the result of credit constraints. 
                                                           
33 Behrman (1997) points out that most analytical and policy work has been derived within this framework.  
34 Carneiro and Heckman (2002) also point out that if the objective of policy is to maximise human capital then 




There are criticisms of this procedure. First, the measure of family income used at the time of 
college entry is at a specific point in time and includes transitory elements and a high degree 
of measurement error. A stronger case would exist if a proxy for permanent income were 
used. Second, early test scores are a function of parent income and so their inclusion creates a 
downward bias on the income coefficient. This rests on whether there is enough variation in 
the income data after including test scores and family characteristics for significance tests to 
have power. Third, some of the controls such as family structure are at least in part a function 
of income. How long run family income influences early test scores remains unanswered. 
The correlation between parent income and status and children‟s education attainment has 
long been documented in the UK.
35 Most research into the causes has been multi-disciplinary 
and consistent with the life cycle approach to human capital. For example, Hutchison, Prosser 
and Wedge (1979) use children‟s test scores at the age of 7 to show they are strong predictors 
of  scores  at  the  age  of  16.  Currie  and  Thomas  (2002)  show  that  early  test  scores  are  a 
significant predictor of employment and wage rates at 33 years of age. Relatively few papers 
using  UK  data  have  examined  credit  constraints,  perhaps  because  tertiary  education  has 
traditionally not involved fees.  
Dearden,  McGranahan  and  Sianesi  (2004)  directly  apply  Carneiro  and  Heckman  (2002) 
methodology  to  the  National  Child  Development  Survey  (NCDS)  (1958)  and  BCS.  As 
measures of education attainment they look at the likelihood of staying in continuous full 
time  education  past  the  16  minimum  leaving  age  and  completing  a  higher  education 
qualification. They find that less than the 7% upper bound estimated in the US are possibly 
credit  constrained  in  the  UK.  The  NCDS  data  show  almost  no  significant  evidence  of 
possible  credit  constraints  while  the  BCS  show  up  to  7%  of  statistically  significant 
differences which may be due to credit constraints.
36 
However, Dearden et al do not address the criticisms of Carneiro and Heckman and perhaps 
compounded them by their choice of controls. For example, the tests at 11 years old are in the 
same year as the all important 11 plus exam which largely determined the type of secondary 
education for the child. Preparation is likely to be heavily influenced by what p arents expect 
                                                           
35 See, for example, Rowntree‟s famous study of the causes of poverty (1901). 
36 Dearden et al. (2004) find that using the NCDS data only 2% of men and 5% of women, and using the BCS 
data 3% of men and up to 6% of women are possibly credit constrained in completing a higher education 





37 Similarly, family income is reported on a three day week due to industrial action 
and may be more susceptible to measurement error. Finally, including control variables will 
capture much of the between family variation in income at that date. All of these judgements 
reduce the chance of finding credit constraint effects and are addressed below. 
The  Carneiro  and  Heckman  model  is  re -estimated  with  three  alternative  sets  of  early 
attainment and income measures to address these shortcomings. First, test scores at age 7 are 
used instead of age 11. Figure 1 in section 2 shows that test scores by income group at this 
age are similar to test scores by income group at age 11. Second, a wealth variable is 
constructed to reflect permanent inco me and remove transitory elements perhaps which 
would bias the results towards zero.
 38 This is a categorical variable based on an approach by 
Michael (2002) adding together a list of six amenities describing parent‟s home: an indoor 
WC and bathroom, central heating, fridge, freezer, telephone, black and white TV, colour 
TV, one car, two cars. As well as perhaps being a better reflection of permanent income there 
is much smaller loss of sample size of 27% and it is reasonably symmetrically distributed. 
Figure A1 shows that the wealth index has a similar correlation with test scores as income but 
the  difference  in  participation  rates  at  16  between  children  from  the  highest  and  lowest 
quartiles is 20 percentage points using income and 35 percentage points using wealth.  
Figure A1: Child Participation at School at 16 by Parent Income and Wealth 
 
Source: NCDS sweep 3. Income refers to parents‟ total income and wealth refers to wealth constructed by the 
number of amenities in the home. 
                                                           
37 Places in grammar schools were financially assisted. But given that the high proportion of grammar school 
children to enter university they imply a large indirect cost.   
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Table A.3 recreates table 3 in Carneiro and Heckman (2002) using the results from the NCDS 
to  compare participation rates in  continuous  full  time education after 16. Panel  A is  the 
preferred specification using test scores at 7 and the constructed measure of wealth to address 
the concerns discussed above. Panels B uses family income and test scores at 7 and panel C 
uses  family  income  and  test  scores  at  11  as  a  comparator.  Note  that  the  sample  in  this 
exercise is the cohort members themselves, while the empirical analysis in this paper is with 
regard to a random sample of cohort members children. 
Column A contains the estimates of (A1) without separating into ability tertiles therefore 
restricting 0   . The beta coefficients measure estimated attainment gaps by income quartile 
relative to the highest quartile with the standard errors adjacent. For example, children from 
the lowest income quartile have a 0.35 lower probability of staying in full time education at 
16. The F test rejects the null that that all betas are zero. Column B repeats the exercise but 
includes the control variables. It is clear that controlling for longer term factors associated 
with differences in income greatly  reduce the importance of current  wealth or income in 
determining the education attainment. The statistical and economic significance of the results 
in panel A are much higher than in panels B and C which supports the use of the wealth 
variable and test scores at age 7.  
Columns C-E report repeated estimation of B for each of the three ability tertiles. This is the 
Carneiro and Heckman model. Taking account of early age ability reduces the attainment 
gaps further, less in panel A than in B and C. By weighting each statistically significant beta 
by  the  number  of  children  in  each  cell  relative  to  the  sample  creates  an  estimate  of  the 
proportion  of  children  possibly  from  credit  constrained  families.  The  results  show  that 
between  3.9%  (panel  A)  and  1.7%  (panel  C)  are  were  possibly  credit  constrained  in  the 
traditional sense.
39 Counting only the coefficients which are statistically significant, the range 
reduces to 3.8% to 1.7% respectively. It is interesting to note that there is more evidence 
consistent  with  credit  constraints  in  the  lower  ability  tertile,  a  finding  consistent  with 
Carneiro and Heckman. In their words, there is evidence that more “dumb rich” kids stay on 
than “dumb poor” kids. 
Despite  the  ongoing  debate  some  consensus  of  the  importance  of  credit  constraints  is 
emerging. For example, Krueger (2003) acknowledges that credit constraints (or a convex 
                                                           
39 Including non-statistically significant betas raise the proportions of the sample who may be credit constrained 




cost of funds function) “could be interpreted as reflecting an increasing marginal distaste for 
school that varies with family income.”
40 This seems to be close to the life cycle assessment 
where skills beget skills and motivation begets motivation. A crude summary to date is that: 
(a) differences in family income and child attainment are persistent and consistent with credit 
constraints; (b) after taking account of long run influences, the size of constraints are likely to 
be much smaller than earlier reported, perhaps up to 4% based on UK survey evidence; and, 
(c) differences in parent resources influence the early test scores which correlate with later 
levels of education attainment. How different family resources influence early test scores 
remains unanswered. 
                                                           
40 Krueger (2003) in Krueger and Heckman (2003) p.57.  
 
Table A.3 NCDS Cohort Members Education Attainment by Parental Income and Wealth  
      Unconditional      Conditional     Ability tertile 1 (low)     Ability tertile 2 (mid)     Ability tertile 3 (high) 
      Beta  SE    Beta  SE    Beta  SE    Beta  SE    Beta  SE 
Panel A:  stay on at school after 16 by total family income quartiles and ability at 7 years old 
Q4-Q1 
 
0.2025***  0.0168 
 
0.0832***  0.0173 
 
0.0700***  0.0292 
 
0.0789***  0.0297 
 
0.0387  0.0305 
Q4-Q2 
 
0.1674***  0.0165 
 
0.0535***  0.0166 
 
0.0621***  0.0286 
 
0.0379  0.0285 
 
0.0136  0.0288 
Q4-Q3 
 
0.0540***  0.0180 
 
0.0186  0.0177 
 
0.0121  0.0312 
 
0.0291  0.0304 
 
-0.0239  0.0301 









Panel B:  stay on at school after 16 by family wealth proxy quartiles plus controls and ability at 7 years old 
Q4-Q1 
 
0.3129***  0.0134 
 
0.1101***  0.0155 
 
0.0768***  0.0255 
 
0.1176***  0.0266 
 
0.0639***  0.0281 
Q4-Q2 
 
0.2067***  0.0156 
 
0.0709***  0.0164 
 
0.0903***  0.0282 
 
0.0595***  0.0275 
 
0.017  0.0210 
Q4-Q3 
 
0.0891***  0.0153 
 
0.0319***  0.0154 
 
0.0232  0.0285 
 
0.0191  0.0263 
 
0.029  0.2557 









Panel C:  stay on at school after 18 by family wealth quartiles plus controls and ability at 7 years old 
  Q4-Q1 
 
0.3129***  0.015 
 
0.0878***  0.0172 
 
0.0162  0.0256 
 
0.1107***  0.0291 
 
0.0381  0.0328 
Q4-Q2 
 
0.2270***  0.0169 
 
0.0529***  0.018 
 
0.0102  0.0275 
 
0.0561*  0.03 
 
0.0113  0.0339 
Q4-Q3 
 
0.1183***  0.0151 
 
0.0317**  0.0154 
 
-0.017  0.0253 
 
0.0593**  0.026 
 
0.0071  0.0207 










Note: OLS estimates with robust t statistics in parenthesis where *** shows statistical significnace at 1%, **shows statistical significance at 5% and * shows statistical 
significance at 10%. Fourth quartiles (richest) in the base dummy (dropped). Controls include: region of school, school leaving age of both parents, father's social class, a 
missing parent dummy and number of children in family all recorded at age 7. 
     
    
 
ANNEX 3 
The „belief in a just world‟ measure is checked to see whether the responses to one statement 
are dominant. This is important because the interpretation of the statement may have a time 
specific content. Each of the responses is measured on a five point scale and is standardized. 
In column (4) the first principal component of the three sets of responses is used rather than 
adding the responses. The results show that the responses to each statement and the principal 
component measure are all statistically significant. 
Table A4: Regression Results of Early Test Scores on Beliefs with Robustness Checks 
(Dependent variable: Peabody Vocabulary Test Score) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  PVSS  PVSS  PVSS  PVSS 
Business   0.961***       
  (2.60)       
Management     1.486***     
    (4.01)     
Wealth      0.613*   
      (1.73)   
PC_BJW        0.971*** 
        (3.50) 
Child health  -1.989**  -2.081**  -1.952**  -1.931** 
  (2.08)  (2.21)  (2.07)  (2.02) 
Parent ability  1.707***  1.579***  1.728***  1.645*** 
  (5.24)  (4.91)  (5.33)  (4.96) 
Parent quals5  0.869***  0.829***  0.899***  0.827*** 
  (7.47)  (7.08)  (7.80)  (6.99) 
Family income5  0.086  0.080  0.095  0.084 
  (0.90)  (0.85)  (0.99)  (0.87) 
Household size  0.237  0.231  0.172  0.283 
  (0.45)  (0.45)  (0.33)  (0.54) 
Constant  78.542***  78.437***  77.535***  78.578*** 
Observations  1512  1524  1524  1493 
R-squared  0.16  0.17  0.16  0.16 
OLS  estimates  with  robust  t  statistics  in  parentheses:  ***  shows  statistical  significance  at  1%,  **  shows 
statistical significance at 5% and * shows statistical significance at 10%. Each regression includes child controls 
for age, sex, birth weight and whether a first child and cohort member controls for sex, non-white, marital 
problems if teenage mother. ZBJW is a standardised measure of the „belief in a just world‟ index.  Family 
income 5 refers to net income measured in 1991. Business refers to statement 1, management refers to statement 
2 and wealth refers to statement 3 in table 1 in section 4. In column (4), PC-BJW is the first principal component 
of responses to the three statements.   
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